Krige får deres eget liv

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Peter Andreas Fog

Denne gang er redaktøren i det filosofiske hjørne men starter ud med at læse Klaus Riskærs nye bog.

“Krige får deres eget liv og ender sjældent der hvor de begyndte” skriver Klaus Riskær Pedersen i forordet til sin just udkomne bog ‘Den Ukrainske Blindgyde’. Det er en hurtig og let læst bog, der giver et godt overblik over alt det vi overser i nyhedsstrømmen (der er dog en endnu bedre bog på trapperne). En krigs eget liv er især et stort problem for større koalitioner, der bliver dannet på en præmis, som udviklingen snart udhuler.

Under Golfkrigen i 1991 lykkedes det for den daværende præsident George Bush at samle det meste af Verden bag en krigsindsats, der skulle smide Irak ud af Kuwait. USA’s enorme militær, bygget til at bekrige Warszawa Pagten, skulle nok gøre arbejdet hurtigt. En begrænset målsætning, en begrænset tidsramme og en arbejdsfordeling, der passede resten af koalitionens parter. Men da den amerikanske general Norman Schwarzkopf ville køre videre mod Bagdad, efter at den irakiske hær var blevet nedkæmpet, for at fjerne Saddam Husseins styre, slog de arabiske lande hælene i. Dette var ikke en del af aftalen og det ville destabilisere Mellemøsten. Det var ikke et dårligt rationale, viste det sig senere.

Krigen i Ukraine har mildt sagt ikke den samme afklaring, som Vesten hastede hovedkuls til Ukraines hjælp. For det var kun Vesten, der var forskrækkede over Ruslands brutale brud på den liberale og regelbaserede verdensorden. Resten af verden var ligeglad med den orden, som de så som Vestens orden. En orden, der de seneste tre årtier er blevet forvaltet helt arbitrært. Og det er vigtigt, da en af de første strategier for at presse Rusland var at gøre landet til en pariastat.

Siden er formålet med vores engagement blevet til alt fra at stoppe Rusland, smide dem ud af Ukraine, brække Rusland op i mindre bidder langs etniske grænser, slide russerne ned, så de ikke udgør en trussel, eller blot holde dem hen mens Europa, eller rettere EU, de to størrelser misvisende blandes sammen, kan bygge en stor hær op og kæmpe den uundgåelige krig.

Argumentet for at brække Rusland op hviler på en præmis om at diversitet udhuler sammenhængskraften, hvilket blot underminerer ideen om Kremls imperiale drømme. Og ideen med sanktionerne var at presse eliten af oligarker økonomisk, til at smide Putin ud eller i det mindste presse ham til forhandlingsbordet. I den forståelse var Ruslands angreb på Ukraine Putins impuls og ikke et udtryk for Ruslands interesse. På den måde havde alle begivenheder, heriblandt Vestens handlinger, altså ingen rolle spillede, hele miseren startede med invasionen og det er alt offentligheden skal tænke på.

Da oligarkerne ikke pressede Putin, hverken til at gå af eller opføre sig ordentligt, konkluderede man ikke at man havde taget fejl i både, hvorledes den russiske stat fungerede og hvilke motiver den havde for sine handlinger; man konkluderede blot at Putin nu var diktator. En ‘Hitler’ der havde irrationelle imperiale drømme og en sådan måtte bekæmpes, uanset hvor lidt resten af Verden forstod værdien af vores regelbaserede verdensorden.

Om 'femte generations krigsførsel'

Imens er Ukraine blevet ødelagt og står i en uoverskuelig demografisk katastrofe. Rusland har opbygget en stor moderne og kamp-hærdet(!) hær med en tilhørende krigsøkonomi. Forholdet mellem russere og ukrainere er forbitret de næste par generationer. Tilliden mellem EU og Rusland er væk. USA har klogt valgt at arbejde sig selv ud af konflikten. Og EU virker nu ironisk nok, selv mere isolerede i en verden, der ikke længere er imponerede over det gamle kontinents bløde magt og bløde værdier.

Krige får ikke blot deres eget liv, de ændrer også karakter med den teknologiske udvikling. Men selv om “Innovation and tactical cleverness matter in Fifth Generation warfare, but they cannot substitute for the industrial and technological base necessary to sustain prolonged drone operations” (Og det er endnu en af priserne for den liberale hegemonis illusion. Vi udskibede vores industri fordi vi havde finere ting at tage os til end produktion af døde ting) skrev Vox Dei for tidsskriftet AI Central i sommer. Og så blev krigen i Ukraine set som et, for os, sørgeligt ‘case study’

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The World's First Fifth Generation Conflict

The war in Ukraine, beginning with Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, represents the first major conflict between modern militaries in the drone age. Both sides entered the war with substantial conventional forces, but the conflict quickly evolved into something unprecedented: the world's first truly Fifth Generation war. More importantly, it demonstrates how Fifth Generation advantages can shift based on industrial capacity and adaptation over time.

Russia's Failed Initial Approach and Subsequent Adaptation

Russia's initial invasion plan reflected classic Second Generation thinking. Massed armored columns would advance along multiple axes, overwhelming Ukrainian defenses through superior firepower and coordination. The plan assumed secure logistics lines stretching back to Russian territory, with supply convoys moving freely to sustain forward operations.

This approach collapsed within days. Ukrainian forces, equipped with both sophisticated Western-supplied drones and improvised commercial systems, turned Russia's logistics lines into killing fields. The infamous 40-mile convoy approaching Kyiv became a symbol of Second Generation vulnerability in a Fifth Generation environment.

But Russia's response over the subsequent two years demonstrates the critical importance of industrial capacity in Fifth Generation warfare. Unlike previous generations where victory went to the side that could get there first with the most, Fifth Generation warfare ultimately favors the side that can produce and deploy drone systems faster than the enemy can destroy them. Fifth Generation war favors the side that can outlast the other in a constant battle of attrition.

Ukraine's Early Innovation and Later Decline

Ukraine's initial response demonstrated the improvisational nature of Fifth Generation warfare. Faced with a numerically superior enemy, Ukrainian forces leveraged commercial drone technology in ways never before seen in modern conflict.

The transformation was remarkable. Consumer drones, originally designed for photography and recreation, were modified to carry explosives. Navigation software was reprogrammed for autonomous attack missions. Social media platforms became tools for coordinating drone strikes and sharing targeting information.

Most importantly, Ukraine initially democratized precision strike capabilities. Where previous generations of warfare concentrated firepower in specialized units—artillery batteries, tank formations, air force squadrons—Fifth Generation warfare distributes strike capability throughout the entire force structure. Individual soldiers could call in precision drone strikes the way their grandfathers called in artillery.

However, by 2023-2024, Ukraine's early advantages began to erode as Russia mobilized its superior industrial capacity. While Ukraine relied heavily on Western-supplied systems and commercial modifications, Russia began mass-producing dedicated military drones. The numbers tell the story: by late 2023, Russia was producing an estimated 6,000 drones per month compared to Ukraine's few hundred.

The Industrial Dimension of Fifth Generation Warfare

The Ukrainian conflict has revealed that Fifth Generation warfare is not just about innovation and tactics—it is fundamentally about industrial capacity. The side that can produce drone systems faster and in greater quantities than the enemy can destroy them gains decisive advantages.

Russia's transformation demonstrates this principle. After the initial disasters of 2022, Russian forces reorganized around mass drone production. They established dedicated drone manufacturing facilities, streamlined supply chains for electronic components, and created training programs for operators. Most critically, they developed the industrial capacity to treat drones as expendable resources rather than precious assets.

This industrial approach has yielded devastating results. By 2024, Russia was deploying what military analysts call "drone storms"—coordinated attacks involving hundreds of unmanned systems launched simultaneously. Ukrainian air defenses, designed to handle dozens of targets, found themselves overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

The Collapse of Ukraine's Logistics Sanctuary

The most telling indicator of Russia's Fifth Generation adaptation is the casualty distribution within Ukrainian forces. Current intelligence estimates suggest that 65 percent of Ukrainian casualties now occur between 5 and 20 kilometers from the front lines—precisely the logistics space that was supposed to be safe.

This represents the complete collapse of the logistics sanctuary that defined all previous generations of warfare. Ukrainian supply convoys, maintenance facilities, command posts, and troop concentrations find themselves under constant attack by Russian drone systems. Areas that were relatively secure in 2022 have become as dangerous as the front lines themselves.

The psychological impact has been devastating. Ukrainian soldiers report that the stress of knowing they can be attacked anywhere, anytime, has fundamentally altered the nature of military service. There is no longer any distinction between combat troops and support personnel—everyone is a potential target for drone attack.

Russia's Electronic Warfare Superiority

Perhaps most significantly, Russia has achieved dominance in the electronic warfare aspect of Fifth Generation conflict. Russian forces now deploy sophisticated jamming systems that can disrupt Ukrainian drone operations while protecting their own systems through frequency-hopping and encrypted communications.

This electronic warfare superiority manifests in multiple ways. Russian jammers can force Ukrainian drones to crash or return to base without completing their missions. Russian spoofing systems can redirect Ukrainian autonomous weapons to attack friendly forces. Most importantly, Russian electronic warfare creates "corridors" where their own drones can operate while denying the same space to Ukrainian systems.

The development reflects a fundamental principle of Fifth Generation warfare: electronic spectrum dominance is as important as physical terrain control. The side that controls the electromagnetic environment can operate their own systems while denying the enemy the ability to use theirs effectively.

The Adaptation Cycle

The Ukrainian war demonstrates the rapid adaptation cycles that characterize Fifth Generation warfare. Both sides continuously develop new technologies, tactics, and countermeasures in response to enemy innovations. But the side with superior industrial capacity and resources ultimately gains decisive advantages.

Ukraine's early tactical innovations—social media coordination, commercial drone modifications, improvised autonomous weapons—were brilliant adaptations to resource constraints. But they could not compensate for Russia's fundamental advantages in industrial capacity and electronic warfare capabilities.

This has profound implications for other militaries studying the conflict. Innovation and tactical cleverness matter in Fifth Generation warfare, but they cannot substitute for the industrial and technological base necessary to sustain prolonged drone operations. The side that can produce, deploy, and replace drone systems faster than the enemy can destroy them will ultimately prevail.

Strategic Implications

The evolution of the Ukrainian conflict reveals several critical truths about Fifth Generation warfare:

First, early advantages in Fifth Generation capabilities can be temporary if not backed by adequate industrial capacity. Ukraine's innovative use of commercial drones provided significant advantages in 2022, but these advantages evaporated when Russia mobilized its superior manufacturing capabilities.

Second, the logistics space—traditionally safe areas 5-20 kilometers behind the front lines—has become as dangerous as the front lines themselves. This fundamental change requires complete reorganization of military logistics, medical evacuation, command structures, and support operations.

Third, electronic warfare capabilities are crucial force multipliers in Fifth Generation conflict. The side that achieves electromagnetic spectrum dominance can operate their own systems while denying the enemy the ability to use theirs effectively.

Finally, Fifth Generation warfare favors industrial powers that can mass-produce simple, expendable systems over those that rely on small numbers of sophisticated platforms. The economics of drone warfare—where $500 systems can destroy $5 million targets—fundamentally alters traditional military calculations about force structure and procurement.

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“Mange EU-medlemsstater er trukket længere ind i denne konflikt, end hvad der tjener deres nationale sikkerhedsinteresse” skriver Riskær Pedersen videre i sin lille effektive bog

Det er moralsk svært at forstå, når europæiske toppolitikere begrunder vores engagement med, “at ukraine fører vores krig”. Andre fører ikke ens krig. Krige fører man sammen, hvis man har fælles interesser, alt andet er kynisk og politisk spekulation…

Og nu er Ukraine ødelagt…